Presuppositional apologetics doesn’t work - 29 August 2009 |
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I’m joking. Of course, presuppositional apologetics works. I’m a presuppositionalist. Cornelius Van Til and Greg Bahnsen are (among) my theological heroes.
But it’s intriguing how often presuppositional arguments fail on the streets and doorsteps of 21st-century London. I’m sure part of the reason boils down to the incompetence of the apologist – Greg Bahnsen would, I’m sure, have had more success than me. But perhaps there’s more to it than that.
Put simply, the aim of presuppositional apologetics is to expose the inconsistency of an unbeliever’s worldview by demonstrating that their presuppositions (about human nature, God, etc) are inconsistent with other things they claim to believe and/or the way they live. For example, if Johnny claims to believe in absolute moral values, but denies that there is a God, a presuppositional apologist might seek to demonstrate that belief in absolute morality requires belief in God. To remain logically consistent, Johnny must either embrace theism or reject morality.
The problem arises with that phrase ‘logically consistent’. The presuppositionalist seeks to expose the inadequacy of the unbeliever’s worldview by a process of logical reasoning. Beginning with Johnny’s claim to believe in absolute morality, the presuppositionalist asks as series of questions (What’s the moral standard? Who decides? What should two people do if they disagree? And so on) intended to drive Johnny to the conclusion that his unbelief must be abandoned if he wants a logically coherent worldview.
Unfortunately, anyone illogical enough to embrace both unbelief and absolute morality is likely to have difficulty following the logical argument necessary to expose the inconsistency of such a view. This won’t always be the case – perhaps the scales might fall from an unbeliever’s eyes during such a conversation. But such a miraculous transformation is precisely what is needed, for presuppositionalism seeks to undermine an unbeliever’s worldview by a process that relies on the one thing we know that unbelief lacks: logical coherence.
Perhaps a subtle modification might help. Much presuppositionalism starts the process of logical reasoning from the point in the unbeliever’s philosophical system where the inconsistency is most glaring to us. The clash between atheism and absolute morality is an obvious example.
But what about starting from the point where the incoherence of the unbeliever’s worldview is most glaringly obvious to them? The point where their folly gives rise not to an unnoticed philosophical glitch, but to very obvious emotional trauma. We keep our presuppositionalism, but apply it where it has a bit more experiential traction.
Posted by Steve Jeffery · Topics: Minister's Blog